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preserve his constitutional rights. This case, however, goes farther than
to merely advance the doctrine of implied invitation, since the case was
based on the right of the officers to assume that they were invited to enter,
which is, to say the least, not construing the constitutional guaranty liber-
ally in favor of private persons. Flum v. State, supra.
As a question of justice in the particular case, there could be no doubt
of the guilt of the defendants, but as a matter of law it seems that the
court has made new law in regard to searches and seizures that has not
yet received the sanction of the courts of other jurisdictions. For other
case notes on the same general subject, see 5 Ind. L. J. 457, 642.
H. N. F.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Suit in equity to re-
strain the issuance of $250,000 worth of municipal bonds to defray expenses
of establishing a park in the city of Fort Wayne as authorized by Sec.
10678 et seq., Burns Ann. St. 1926. This money was found to be necessary
for the improvements. The requirements of the statute had been carried
out and the bonds were sold. The demurrers to each paragraph were sus-
tained. Appeal was made on the grounds that the act violated several parts
of the Constitution of Indiana, including Article 13, Sec. 1, placing a limi-
tation upon municipal indebtedness. Held, affirmed, no violation of the
Constitution. Johnson v. Board of Park Com' rs of Fort Wayne. Supreme
Court of Indiana, December 17, 1930, 174 N. E. 91.
The problem of the debt limitation has become a very serious one for
the courts. New corporations taking in the same territorial limits of
existing corporations have been upheld on the basis of some new and addi-
tional powers and a new name. West Chicago Park Coin'rs v. City of
Chicago, 152 Ill. 392, 38 N. E. 695. The original purpose of Constitutional
debt limits seems quite obviously to protect the taxpayer by restricting
borrowing power, but in a majority of cases the courtt seemingly have been
overcome by the form used and have allowed new debts to be incurred.
The one principle upon which the courts are consistent is that there can
only be one corporation having the same powers over a particular district.
Taylor v. City of Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, 281; Strosser v. City of Fort
Wayne, 100 Ind. 443.
Along some lines the courts of Indiana have interpreted the provisions
strictly. There have been cases that have laid down the rule that if the
Constitutional limit is reached, there may not be liabilities for even current
expenses of government. LaPorte v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co.,
146 Ind. 466.
In some states the distinction is made between voluntary and involun-
tary obligations and those states apply the debt limit to the former only.
Ranch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 48 Pac. 253; Barnard v. Knox Co., 37
Fed. 563. Indiana adopts the rather stringent rule of making no difference
between the obligations. Sackett v. New Albany, 188 Ind. 473; Brashear v.
Madison, 142 Ind. 685. In the principal case, contrary to the general rules
of the other decisions, an agency of the city was allowed to issue bonds with
no effect upon the debt limit of the city. The general rule is that the in-
debtedness must be included in that of the corporation where only a depart-
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ment or board of the municipality is acting. Orvis v. Park Com'rs, 88 Iowa
674, 56 N. W. 294.
The liberal construction of similar limitations in other jurisdictions has
led to such burdens upon property as to make the provisions of little or no
utility. The discussion of Justice McCabe seems to be one possible solu-
tion, "The court of equity may look through and disregard mere forms to
substance of things. If it were not so the legislature may in every in-
stance evade the 13th article of the Constitution and make it practically
a dead letter. To accomplish that result, whenever it deems it desirable
that a municipality or political corporation should become indebted beyond
the limit prescribed in the article, all that would be necessary to do so,
would be enact a statute authorizing a board of commissioners to issue and
sell bonds in the name of the county and levy a tax upon the property
within the municipal corporation to pay the bonds." Board of Com'rs v.
Reeves, 148 Ind. 467, 475. Another possible solution is to pass another
amendment limiting the aggregate indebtedness of all corporations within
the same territory as is provided in the South Carolina Constitution, Art.
10, Sec. 5. R. R. D.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT - INTOXICATING LIQUOR-
TIMELY OBJECTION.-Officers having information that intoxicating liquor
was to be delivered at a certain place, stationed themselves there. The
defendant with three companions stopped the car he was driving at this
place. As the four men alighted from the coupe, the officers confronted
them with pistols. The defendant fled, was fired at several times, but
escaped. The officers arrested his three companions, seized the car, broke
the lock on it and found intoxicating liquor. Said officers had no warrant
of any kind. Defendant was subsequently arrested, and at his trial for
transporting intoxicating liquor, held some eleven months later, he objected
to introduction of the officers' testimony as to the results of the search, no
motion to quash such evidence having been filed. Objections overruled,
defendant appealed. Held, reversed, new trial ordered, search being based
on mere suspicion was illegal, and evidence was thus wrongfully intro-
ducd. (Martin, J., dissenting.) Karlen v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana,
December 31, 1930, 174 N. E. 89.
'It is well established that an officer may make an arrest or conduct a
search and seizure without a warrant on reasonable and probable cause
for believing the person arrested or whose property is searched is com-
mitting or has committed a felony. Koseielski v. State, 199 Ind. 546, 158
N. E. 902; De Long v. State, 201 Ind. 302, 168 N. E. 22; Long v. State,
89 Ind. App. 496; 167 N. E. 140; Murphy v. State, 197 Ind. 360, 151 N. E.
97; Boyd v. State, 198 Ind. 55, 152 N. E. 278; 4 Ind. Law J. 311.
The United States Supreme Court stated the rule thus: "On reason and
authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant
are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruc-
tion, the search and seizure are valid." Carroll v. United States (1923),
267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, 39 A. L. R. 790. The applica-
tion of this rule is often, however, exceedingly complicated.
